On Aug. 25, 2005, just three days after the last Israeli had pulled out of the Gaza Strip, the first rocket was fired into Israel. It struck a neighborhood on the northern edge of Sderot, shattering any illusions of calm that might have accompanied Israel's unilateral territorial withdrawal.
The Disengagement Plan, as it was called, had been excruciatingly painful, involving the evacuation of over 8,000 residents and the demolition of 21 communities. In the lead-up to the withdrawal, as Israel coordinated with the Palestinian Authority, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon promised that any rocket fire following the pullout would be met with an aggressive response.
But that response never materialized. Instead, Hamas continued its rocket fire largely unchecked, and Israel opted for containment over decisive action. By the time Sharon suffered his first stroke in December 2005 and a second, debilitating one in January 2006, it was too late. A transitional government took over, and the groundwork was laid for the June 2006 abduction of an Israeli soldier and the relentless attacks that followed. The opportunity to establish meaningful deterrence had been missed.
This historical backdrop looms large when examining the new ceasefire that took effect early Wednesday morning between Israel and Hezbollah. The agreement marks the beginning of a 60-day transition period during which the IDF is expected to withdraw from southern Lebanon, allowing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy thousands of troops in the area. Hezbollah, according to the terms, is barred from redeploying in the south. Moreover, a side agreement brokered with the United States grants Israel the right to act should Hezbollah violate these terms.
While the agreement is a diplomatic achievement, its ultimate success hinges on a significant shift in Israel's national defense doctrine. For decades, Israel has refrained from adopting a policy of preemptive warfare. This restraint stemmed from a desire to avoid being perceived as the aggressor. Yet today, as the dust settles on this front in the 14-month-long conflict, the necessity of preemption has never been clearer.
Victory in war is not merely about battlefield achievements; it is about securing long-term security and confidence for a nation's citizens. On Wednesday morning, Israelis did not feel victorious. They felt anxious, wary of whether the ceasefire would hold and if Hezbollah would strike again.
A total victory—the term Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu coined during the war—is not when your enemy is still in possession of thousands of rockets and fighters, as well as the ability to attack. It is not when 60,000 of your citizens still feel scared to return to their homes near the border which they were forced to evacuate in October 2023 after the Hamas and Hezbollah attacks.
Yes, Hezbollah has suffered profound setbacks. Its leadership has been decimated, and its operational capabilities have been diminished to an extent that seemed unthinkable a year ago. Yet the decision to end the war now feels reminiscent of Israel's past policy toward Hamas: fight until the enemy is weakened, negotiate a ceasefire brokered by international actors, and hope quiet prevails. It was a strategy built on optimism rather than resolve.
The parallels with the aftermath of the 2006 Second Lebanon War are striking. Then, too, a ceasefire was underpinned by international mechanisms—in that case, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Now, once again, Israel will need to rely on external forces, this time bolstered by U.S. oversight, to ensure Hezbollah's compliance. Yet the core challenge remains: Hezbollah still exists, armed with an impressive arsenal demonstrated just days ago when it launched more than 250 rockets, including strikes deep into Israel's center.
This brings Israel to a critical juncture. The ceasefire's durability will depend on whether the political leadership is willing to embrace preemption. When Hezbollah inevitably violates the agreement, whether by moving rockets into Bint Jbeil or reinforcing positions near the border, Israel will need to act decisively. The real test, however, will not arise in the immediate weeks or months but in the years to come, when complacency sets in, and restraint will be attractive. Will Israel have the resolve to strike when the threat is less immediate but no less dangerous?
In those moments, advocates for action will argue that the Israel Defense Forces must attack to preserve security and deterrence. Others will caution against risking the fragile quiet, dismissing violations as minor provocations unworthy of escalation. These debates have played out before—with Sharon in 2005, with successive governments in their dealings with Hamas, and now, with Hezbollah.
To secure its citizens and the gains achieved during this war, Israel cannot afford hesitation. Every violation must be met with an immediate and unequivocal response. The mistakes of 2005 must not be repeated. The years of restraint that allowed Hamas and Hezbollah to grow into the threats they become must serve as lessons, not precedents.
Ultimately, Israel's ability to maintain its security will depend on the willingness of its political leaders to enforce this new preemption doctrine. This will require not only military readiness but also political courage and an understanding that security cannot be outsourced to international mechanisms or be contingent on the goodwill of others. The real measure of this ceasefire's success will lie in the action taken to uphold it.
As the dust settles from this war, Israel's leadership will need to chart a course that ends the cycles of containment of the past. The gains of this conflict are real and strategic but to preserve them Israel will need resolve. The true test of this moment will only become clear with time, but one thing is certain: the cost of inaction is one Israel can no longer afford.
Yaakov Katz is a senior fellow at JPPI, a global think tank for the Jewish people, and author of Shadow Strike: Inside Israel's Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power and Weapon Wizards: How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower. His next book—"While Israel Slept"—is scheduled for publication by St. Martin's Press in 2025.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
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