When China's President Xi Jinping called U.S. President-elect Donald Trump to congratulate the Republican on his landslide win, he delivered a warning too: The two powers "gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation".
Trump and Xi have already had a taste of economic confrontation in the form of a trade war, kicked off under the former's first term as U.S. president when he introduced swathes of tariffs against Chinese imports—a move swiftly reciprocated by Beijing.
More tariffs are coming in the second term. But there is a far-greater U.S.-China confrontation lurking ominously in the background, one with potentially catastrophic consequences not just for the Indo-Pacific, but for the whole world: A war over Taiwan.
Under its "One China principle," Beijing considers Taiwan a part of China and not an independent state. Its goal is "reunification" and to right what it sees as a wrong stemming from the Chinese Civil War that ended in 1949 with communists in control of Beijing.
Since the 1970s, the U.S. has adopted a "One China policy," whereby Washington maintains official relations with Beijing and does not recognize Taiwanese independence, but has strong unofficial ties and commits to helping Taiwan with its defense capabilities
Washington also maintains "strategic ambiguity" over whether it would intervene militarily against a Chinese invasion to coerce Taiwan into reunification—also sometimes referred to as "integration"—though previous administrations have strongly hinted that they would.
The island of Taiwan, a prosperous democracy of nearly 14,000 square miles in size and with a population of 23.5 million, most of whom are ethnically Han Chinese, is of strategic significance in the Indo-Pacific for a number of reasons.
It sits between the East China Sea and South China Sea, with the Taiwan Strait connecting the two, and is in the middle of the "first island chain" of archipelagos. This gives it both trading and naval importance with security implications for China as well as America's key regional allies, such as Japan and South Korea.
Taiwan is also the world's major hub for semiconductor manufacturing—accounting for more than half of the global market—which is crucial for the microchips used in technology spanning consumer gadgets to cutting-edge military hardware, making it of huge utility to the West and a high-value prize for China.
Both China's PLA and the Taiwanese army regularly hold dramatic military drills simulating the attack and defense of the island, signaling their readiness for battle and—each side hopes—the futility of a war for their opponents.
Chinese air and naval forces also routinely enter Taiwanese space to show force and test the island's defensive reflexes.
To many observers, reunification is a question of when, not if. The more urgent question is: How? Will it be at the end of a Chinese gun once Beijing calculates that the American appetite for defending Taiwan has dissipated? Or will it be through diplomatic means?
China's recent upending of the post-1997 arrangements in Hong Kong suggests it is prepared to use force—or a show of it at least—to achieve reunification regardless of popular opinion, though its "one country, two systems" position was different to Taiwan's.
With Trump back in the White House, and his apparent preference for deal-making over involving the U.S. in armed conflict, will China calculate that the time is right to invade Taiwan? Newsweek put the question to experts. This is what they said.
Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program, Stimson Center
China's Taiwan planning does not depend on who is in the White House, but if China perceives a higher likelihood of U.S. support of Taiwan independence, they are more likely to resort to the use of force.
With a Trump presidency, the Chinese are definitely more keen on preparing for a military scenario, as the worse case scenario becomes more likely in their mind.
Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director, GMF Indo-Pacific
Whether China decides to invade Taiwan will be determined by many factors.
Does the PLA have the capability to take Taiwan by force at a cost that is acceptable to the Chinese Communist Party?
Does the U.S. have the capability and resolve to defend Taiwan and does Taiwan have the capability and resolved to defend itself?
Has the U.S. or Taiwan taken actions that are perceived by Xi Jinping as threatening his power and CCP legitimacy?
Minghao Zhao, Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University
Donald Trump has no willingness to see big armed conflicts between China and America across the Taiwan Strait.
But Beijing is concerned about the difference between Trump himself and his national security chiefs, many of whom would be very hawkish toward China, even arguing for giving Taiwan full diplomatic recognition.
Beijing's main goal is to deter Taiwan independence, rather than realize military reunification. The costs could be very huge and it is not in Beijing's interest to take the initiative to start a war across the Taiwan Strait.
However, we need to be very cautious about the possible conflict. With the second Trump presidency, there may be a bumpy road for U.S.-China relations in light of possible trade war 2.0.
That could derail U.S.-China dialogues and make misunderstanding and miscalculation more likely, as the situation during the first term of Trump. The diplomatic ties almost collapsed then.
Another factor is about the political leaders in Taiwan. William Lai is a pro-independence politician and he may take bold moves that bring more troubles to U.S.-China relations. This is a wild card.
Bates Gill, Senior Fellow, National Bureau of Asian Research
The most important factors bearing on China's decision to invade Taiwan have not changed. They have to do with the PLA's preparedness and ability to prevail. Of course it matters to Xi what the U.S. response will be, but for now he must assume that the U.S. will respond forcefully.
In the near-term—the next four years of a Trump presidency—it seems unlikely China would launch an invasion, not only because of the PLA's preparedness and possible U.S. reaction, but because there are still many other actions short of war Beijing can take to turn up the pressure on Taiwan. Such incremental and coercive tightening would be consistent with past PRC practice, rather than the highly risky step of invasion.
All that said, there is no doubt that the likelihood of more PRC threats and shows of force against Taiwan will continue to increase over the coming years.
However, shifting from those tactics to launch an invasion in the next four years would probably require major—and at this point unlikely—changes in the current dynamic: Such as a signal from Washington that it would not defend Taiwan or a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan.
Lyle Goldstein, Director of Asia Engagement, Defense Priorities
In general, I don't think U.S. presidential personalities or parties matter much to Chinese calculations. They have long assumed that U.S. military intervention is a possibility, and are building up both war-fighting and (nuclear) deterrence forces to cope with that perceived threat.
My sense is they are nearing a point, both on the conventional and nuclear side, that they think any U.S. president, whether Trump, Harris, or Biden, would think twice now.
It's true that Trump has made a number of statements, including recently, suggesting that Taiwan could not be defended or even should not be defended.
So, there might indeed be some greater willingness by Beijing to coerce (or even invade) Taiwan during a Trump administration.
However, it's still worth keeping in mind that during the last Trump administration, he was surrounded by many China hawks, who would likely press for U.S. intervention in a Taiwan scenario.
Moreover, there could be somewhat of a "mad man" effect given Trump's record for bombastic speech and occasionally emotive reactions.
In the end, I imagine such factors may balance out, so that the primary determinant will be national will and the actual balance of military power, which tends to increasingly favor Beijing.
It's important to understand that China does not want to fight a war over Taiwan, so if the Trump administration adheres closely to the One China Policy and resists forms of military provocation (e.g. sending troops to Taiwan or undertaking joint exercises with Taiwan), then it is likely that Beijing will continue to live with the status quo.
English (US) ·