Two days after President Joe Biden authorized Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Mission Systems (ATACMS) to strike military targets deeper into Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his own formal announcement about a change to Russia's nuclear doctrine. It likely wasn't a coincidence that Putin's new policy was released so closely to Biden's decision.
While Putin telegraphed an evolution of Russia's nuclear doctrine back in September, it's reasonable to assume Moscow's written version of the change was sped up by Biden's ATACMS move. The Russians have spent months warning Washington that permitting Ukraine to employ longer-range U.S. ballistic missiles into Russian territory would be akin to Washington becoming an active participant in the war against Russia. Russian officials were hopping mad when Biden went ahead anyway. Dmitry Medvedev, a former Russian president and now deputy head of the Russian Security Council engaged in his usual histrionics, threatening that U.S. that NATO targets were now fair game for the Russian military. The Biden administration, which is used to this type of fire-breathing language from the Kremlin, responded with a shrug. "Observing no changes to Russia's nuclear posture, we have not seen any reason to adjust our own nuclear posture or doctrine in response to Russia's statements today," a U.S. National Security Council spokesperson said.
What should we make about Russia's new nuclear policy? First, everybody should calm down. The Russians aren't about to send nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles into Berlin, London, or Washington, D.C. World War III isn't near, no matter what Donald Trump Jr. may say. Putin may be an egomaniac with imperial tendencies and a flare for self-aggrandizement, but he isn't stupid enough to believe a nuclear exchange with the U.S. or NATO would serve Russia's security interests. At this stage in the war with Ukraine, tactical nuclear weapons wouldn't be especially helpful for the Russians either—Russian forces, after all, are slowly advancing on the battlefield, so they aren't needed.
Even so, U.S. policymakers must still take Moscow's changes seriously because they lower the threshold for nuclear use and increase the prospects, however small, of Putin ordering a nuclear strike. In 2020, Russia's nuclear doctrine was quite limited; nuclear weapons would only be considered in response to the use of nuclear weapons or another weapon of mass destruction against Russia (or its allies) or an attack where "the very existence of the state is in jeopardy." What constituted such an attack was never spelled out in order to leave ambiguity in the minds of Russia's adversaries (ambiguity is a key part of deterrence, after all). But presumably, such a strike would need to be of such monumental consequence to Russia that it could no longer act during a crisis. In other words, there was a high bar before the Russian government pressed the nuclear button.
This most recent version lowers that bar. According to the modifications, Moscow could now presumably use its vast arsenal of nuclear warheads after a foreign attack that raises "a critical threat" to Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nuclear weapons could also be used in a number of other scenarios, including if the Russian government receives intelligence about a missile, drone, or air attack on its territory, or if an attack compromises Russia's strategic military capabilities. Belarus is now under the Russian nuclear shield as well, although this shouldn't be a surprise after Putin deployed nuclear warheads on Belarusian soil last year.
Will this new criteria force the Biden administration to reassess its military support to Ukraine? The answer is most certainly no. First, Biden only has two months left in office, and far backtracking, the administration seems to be doing whatever it feasibly can to increase the Ukrainian army's position. Biden followed up his ATACMS decision with another loosening of previous restrictions on anti-personnel mines, which Ukrainian troops can now tap to strengthen their defenses along the frontline in the east and slow down the ongoing Russian offensive there. Ukraine reportedly conducted its first ATACMS strike inside Russia less than a day after receiving Biden's go-ahead, destroying a Russian munitions storage facility about 70 miles north of the Russian-Ukrainian border.
Some will be tempted to disregard the latest Russian nuclear threats as nothing more than obnoxious Russian grumblings. You can't blame them for thinking so; Medvedev, for instance, says and writes so many absurd things nowadays that one wonders whether he should be locked up in an asylum. Others, like Yale University historian Timothy Snyder, go so far as to argue that Russian nuclear posturing shouldn't be taken seriously at all.
Pundits and analysts can afford to be cavalier about it; U.S. policymakers with actual responsibility on their shoulders can't. That goes for both the outgoing Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration. Yes, a Russian nuclear strike may be a low-probability scenario. But it's not zero. If you don't believe me, just ask CIA Director William Burns, who commented months ago that there was a legitimate possibility of Moscow using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine back in the fall of 2022.
If the prospects of a Russian nuclear attack go up by even 1 percent, it's something the U.S. needs to consider as it deliberates on its policy. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
English (US) ·