Just when it seemed he had consolidated his position as Syrian president after the Arab Spring uprising and Islamic State land grabs, Bashar al-Assad's future hangs in the balance after a stunning advance by anti-regime forces, who seized control of key cities.
Assad, whose army is accused by international observers of committing atrocities since the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, including chemical attacks, is heavily reliant on Russian military support to maintain his position and has been for several years.
But Russian President Vladimir Putin is facing his own problems. His stretched army is advancing in Ukraine, but at huge cost in both men and materiel, and Russia is also struggling to expand its influence across Africa, where it has troops in action, too.
With Assad under renewed pressure and his army rapidly losing control to insurgents, and Putin's war-weary economy pushed close to its limits, can Russia still save Syria's president? Newsweek put the question to experts. Here's what they said.
Charles Lister, Senior Fellow, Director, Syria & Counterterrorism, Middle East Institute
Assad's future has never looked more fragile than it does today, and for now, Russia doesn't seem able or perhaps even willing to save him.
The challenge here is that Russia has never at any time deployed a sizable ground force in Syria and that's likely the only thing now that would make a difference.
Syria's armed opposition has trained intensively for the past four years and simply represents a far more potent force than it did before.
When Russia intervened in September 2015, it concentrated its efforts in an air campaign and relied on Syrian regime forces on the ground to make gains. Even then, that took months to show any dividend—but the challenge on the ground is far more difficult today.
The regime just doesn't match up peer-to-peer on the ground.
And beyond military matters, the regime doesn't have widespread support of the population, and all across the country, hotspots of covert opposition are beginning to activate, stretching regime attention and resources yet further.
Mona Yacoubian, Vice President, Middle East and North Africa Center, The U.S. Institute of Peace
Russia played a key role in saving Assad ten years ago when the Syrian regime appeared in danger of collapsing. Fast forward 10 years and it's far from a foregone conclusion that Moscow can do it again. Much has changed.
Russia is encumbered by the conflict that it provoked in Ukraine following its February 2022 invasion. Its bandwidth is stretched thin, raising genuine questions as to whether it can devote the resources or strategic attention needed to save Assad this time.
Perhaps more consequential, Iran and Hezbollah—Russia's key allies who provided critical ground forces to bolster Assad a decade ago—are far weaker today.
Hezbollah has been decimated by months of conflict with Israel, and Iran has been significantly weakened following two rounds of direct conflict with Israel.
Add to this a significantly hollowed out Assad regime—far weaker than it was 10 years ago due to the compounding effects of conflict, sanctions, corruption—and it is truly an open question as to whether Russia can once again save Assad.
Nidal Betare, Managing Director, People Demand Change
Yes, Russia can save the regime. But all indicators show that they do not want to.
The opposition took over vast areas that require a ground operation that the Russians are not willing to take on due to its manpower and weaponry cost.
However, they might draw a line to force Assad to sit with the Turks on the negotiations table; an issue the Russians have been trying to mediate between Assad and Turks with a request from Erdogan, but Assad rejected, and some say he was under an Iranian pressure to decline.
Moreover, the opposition sent messages to the Russians about the willingness to keep good relationships between the "new" Syria and Russia.
One more thing: This time an Iranian interference though their militias in Iraq will transform the war in Syria into a sectarian war, that Russia is not interested in.
In brief, yes Russia could stop the opposition, and can save the regime, but they do not want to.
Brian Carter, Middle East Portfolio Manager, American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project
The little that Russia could provide Syria—given Russian commitments in Ukraine—is unlikely to decisively turn the tide of the Syrian Opposition's advance. There are two primary factors contributing to this.
First, regime units have collapsed twice now, first around Aleppo and again around Hama. These collapses will be difficult to reverse and would probably require an influx of additional forces.
Second, the Syrian Opposition has advanced in many areas without fighting.
The opposition is signing political agreements with local and minority communities in towns and villages throughout northwestern Syria, which is allowing the opposition to advance rapidly.
This is again not something Russia could reverse without a serious influx of competent forces. Syria's best bet may be Iran and its network of armed militias in Syria and the region.
Ziad Majed, Political Scientist, Elliott E. Burdette Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, The American University of Paris
The Russians, who had hoped to strike a comprehensive deal with the Trump administration to reconcile the Kurdish forces with Assad and secure an extension of their territorial control in Syria in exchange for influence over the Syrian-Lebanese border and Hezbollah's activities there, today find themselves constrained by limited resources amid the ongoing upheaval.
They are acutely aware of the vulnerability of Assad's military forces, which for a decade relied heavily on Hezbollah and pro-Iranian Shiite militias. The latter have either retreated or been redeployed to the Lebanese and Iraqi borders.
Moscow now seems to recognize the irreversibility of the situation in northern Syria. Its immediate focus appears to be on halting the opposition's military advances toward Homs and Damascus.
At the same time, it may be forced to work with Turkey to achieve a cease-fire to prevent Assad's collapse.
Ankara, for its part, is likely to approach negotiations from a revised framework—leading to an iteration of the Astana process on different foundations and a new balance of power that would further fragilize Assad without necessarily "eliminating" him.
Fabrice Balanche, Assistant Professor of Geography, Lyon University; Adjunct Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Russia can save Bashar al-Assad by first providing him with planes to block the jihadist offensive, as it did massively in September 2015. However, that can only work if the operation is coordinated with Iran.
Tehran would have to provide the Syrian regime with tens of thousands of infantrymen to regain control of the ground. Because the Syrian army is exhausted and no longer has the courage to fight alone.
Will the Iraqi Shiite militias arrive quickly in Syria? Thursday, December 5, Hezbollah sent 2,000 fighters from the Bekaa to Homs, but they were bombed near Qoseir by the Israeli air force. The Iraqi Hashd Shaabi can fear the same fate.
Then, Russia must reach an agreement with Turkey, which supports Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Ankara wants to control northern Syria and expel the Kurds, a solution that Moscow opposes, even though the Kurds are allies of the United States.
It would also like Bashar al-Assad to step aside in favor of a government dominated by the pro-Turkish Islamist opposition, which would ultimately mean the end of the Russian and Iranian presence.
Finally, if Russia wants Turkey to hold back the jihadists, Putin will probably also have to make concessions in other theaters where he is in competition with Erdogan: The Caucasus and Libya.
Turkey wants to build a land axis with Azerbaijan via South Armenia, which Moscow and Tehran oppose. In Libya, Ankara's Tripolitanian allies are beginning to be seriously suffocated by Marshal Haftar, Putin's ally and leader of Cyrenaica.
Putin's support for soldier Bashar therefore comes through both military and diplomatic channels.
Daniel Gerlach, German Middle East Specialist; Editor, Zenith Middle East Magazine
Russia sounds conspicuously diplomatic and in recent days was accentuating the political process and diplomacy.
At the same time, the Russians should know best about the desolate state of affairs inside the Syrian security and military apparatus. It could be that the Russians have already hedged their interests and prepare for Plan B.
Even though Russia was an ally of Damascus, it has kept in touch with Sunni, Islamist and Muslim Brotherhood affiliated networks in the past.
It is possible that Russia would accept a Sunni sort of regime over Syria. As long as it is authoritarian, driven by an intelligence logic and not an associate of the West.
If Syria breaks up as a result, and if the coastal region splits away from Central Syria, Russia would also try to keep its assets on the Mediterranean.
Asher Kaufman, John M. Regan, Jr. Director, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
The Assad regime is a strategic asset for Russia and Putin will try and do what he can to support this regime and prevent it from losing ground in Syria.
During the heydays of the civil war, Assad's regime was saved thanks to the intervention of Hezbollah, Iran and Russia. With Hezbollah significantly weakened after its war with Israel, it will likely be left for Iran and Russia to intervene in support of Assad.
Russia will need to weigh its priorities in relation to its war on Ukraine since it may need to divert some of its military assets to Syria to support the regime.
As in during the civil war, most of its support for Assad could be through its air force and this could still be done without significantly eroding Russia's military deployment in Ukraine.
Putin may also be banking on Trump as president hoping to achieve significant political gains in Ukraine after a new U.S. administration is installed. In this case, he may be thinking that he would be able to divert some of Russia's military to Syria to support Assad.
The bottom line is that Russia could support Assad if it decides that this is its top priority and consequently is willing to invest a lot of military resources for this purpose.
Steven Heydemann, Janet W. Ketcham 1953 Professor of Middle East Studies, Director, Middle East Studies Program, Smith College
With every kilometer the opposition advances, Assad's future becomes increasingly precarious.
Russia may be able to prevent his regime's complete collapse, preserving his control over Damascus and surrounding areas. Yet the likelihood that it will be able to push opposition forces back to their pre-November 27 lines appears small.
Russia's air assets in Syria are depleted, the regime's military is in disarray, and neither Iran nor Hezbollah seem able to muster the ground forces needed to stem, much less reverse, the opposition's momentum.
Russia may soon determine that its interests are best served by jettisoning Assad and trying to broker a deal between whoever is installed in his place and the opposition.
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